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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the vast majority of children born in the United States, 
their legal parents are determined at birth.1 In every state, there is a 
self-executing statute that identifies the woman who gives birth to a 
 
        †   Associate Dean and Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. 
Thank you to Jacob McKnite and Michael Zwickey for their invaluable research 
assistance. 
        ††  Attorney, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP. 
 1.  JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 26 (2006) (“The 
state directly determines who a child’s legal parents will be at the time of birth and 
then at every moment of a person’s childhood.”); JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF 
THE CHILD 58 (2014) (noting that all parental power is a function delegated by the 
state). 
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2015] CODIFYING THE INTENT TEST 131 
child as the child’s legal mother.2 Also in every state, there are self-
executing statutes that apply a set of presumptions to identify the 
child’s legal father.3 These statutes solidify family relationships at 
the moment of birth, which not only avoids the costly and time-
consuming process of obtaining a court order to determine the 
legal parents of every child born, but also avoids the legal 
uncertainty that the child and parents would endure before such 
an order were issued.4 Through these self-executing parentage 
statutes, children, parents, and the state know, at the moment of 
birth, who the child’s legal parents are and, thereby, who is legally 
responsible for the care and nurturing of the child.5 
The process of a self-executing statute identifying the legal 
parents of a child at the moment of birth is so automatic that it is 
rarely considered.6 The process of determining legal parentage 
through a self-executing statute is nearly identical in every state 
and, it is fair to say, universally accepted by legislators, judges, 
parents, and commentators. This is as it should be: self-executing 
parentage statutes are widely published, accessible to the public, 
create predictable results, and result in an efficient determination 
of parentage at the moment of birth. 
Unfortunately, state parentage statutes fall short of 
accomplishing their intended goals because they do not provide 
legal parents at the moment of birth to every child. It is often only 
children conceived via sexual reproduction who reap the stabilizing 
benefits of state parentage statutes. In contrast, children conceived 
via assisted reproductive technology (ART) most often begin their 
 
 2.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-1125 of the 
2014 Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).  
 3.  See, e.g., FAM. § 7611(a) (Westlaw); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a) 
(Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 257.55; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (Westlaw); see 
also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of 
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233 (2006). 
 4.  See J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 345, 410 (2011) (describing a legal system that did not provide clear 
parentage rules as “chaotic and dysfunctional”). 
 5.  See SHULMAN, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the duties and obligations 
that accompany legal parenthood). 
 6.  Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 649 (2014) (“The vast majority of the time, parentage law 
invisibly supports uncomplicated relationships: a baby is born at a hospital to a 
woman whose male partner is on hand and joyfully identifies himself as father.”). 
2
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lives without clearly identified legal parents.7 It is our contention 
that the time has come for state legislatures to provide 
comprehensive, self-executing parentage statutes that determine 
the legal parents at the moment of birth for all children—
including those conceived via ART. In the past, state legislatures 
might have rationalized that they had not updated their parentage 
statutes to provide legal parents for ART children because ART was 
new, and they were not yet aware of the issue. ART, however, has 
been used in the conception of children for over one hundred 
years8 and, for the past thirty years, has been written about in law 
review articles, debated in state legislatures, and confronted by 
family court judges.9 In the past, state legislatures also might have 
rationalized that they were reluctant to update their parentage 
statutes to provide legal parents for children conceived via ART 
because they wanted to give commentators, legal experts, and 
courts time to experiment with the issue so that the best possible 
approach could be determined. Even assuming that it is good 
legislative practice to let legal parentage of children blow in the 
wind while waiting for someone else to figure out a solution, this 
explanation also is past its prime. For thirty years, legal scholars 
have debated, legislatures have experimented, and courts have 
applied various tests to determine legal parentage of ART 
children.10 Legislatures no longer need to wait to determine the 
best method for determining legal parentage of children conceived 
via ART.11 The overwhelming majority of legal scholars, legislatures, 
 
 7.  ART, broadly speaking, encompasses any means to achieve pregnancy 
other than sexual intercourse. The most common ART procedures are alternative 
insemination and in vitro fertilization. 
 8.  JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 27–28 (2006) 
(noting the use of alternative insemination as early as the late-eighteenth century); 
Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890–1945, 87 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 591, 592 (2012) (“While the number of assisted conceptions was increasing 
in the 1940s, doctors had been using this technically simple technique of family 
formation for decades.”). 
 9.  See infra Part II.B; see also Albert P. Massey, Jr., Artificial Insemination: The 
Law’s Illegitimate Child?, 9 VILL. L. REV. 77, 78–80 (1963). See generally B. Fain 
Tucker, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 33 WOMEN L.J. 57 (1947) (providing 
early commentary on ART).  
 10.  See infra Part II.B. 
 11.  Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the 
Law, 23 VT. L. REV 225, 225–26 (1998) (“[T]he hesitancy of American legislatures 
to take on the task of regulating reproductive technology may well prove to have 
been more beneficial than detrimental. In effect, American law has had a few 
3
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2015] CODIFYING THE INTENT TEST 133 
and courts have reached a consensus: When determining legal 
parentage of children conceived via ART, state legislatures should 
adopt self-executing parentage statutes that identify the intended 
parents as the legal parents of the child at the moment of birth. 
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Marjorie Shultz introduced 
the intent test as a means to determine parentage of children 
conceived via ART.12 According to Professor Shultz, when a child is 
conceived via ART, the persons who intended to bring the child 
into the world and raise the child should be the child’s legal 
parents.13 Since then, numerous legal scholars have endorsed 
Professor Shultz’s intent test.14 In 1993, the California Supreme 
Court first applied the intent test in Johnson v. Calvert.15 In Johnson, 
both the surrogate who gestated the child and the woman who 
provided the egg used to conceive the child claimed to be the 
child’s legal mother.16 The court held that the genetic mother was 
the legal mother, as opposed to the gestational surrogate, because 
the genetic mother was the woman who intended to raise the child 
at the time the child was conceived.17 Since Johnson, over 20% of 
disputed ART parentage cases have applied the intent test,18 and 
over 74% of disputed ART parentage cases have awarded parentage 
to the intended parents, regardless of which test the court used to 
 
decades to try various approaches, to discard those that did not work, and to 
elaborate those that did.”). 
 12.  Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323–26 
(1990). 
 13.  Id. at 323 (“Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques, 
intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought 
presumptively to determine legal parenthood.”). 
 14.  See infra Part II.B.  
 15.  Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 16.  Id. at 778. A gestational surrogate is “a woman who is not an intended 
parent into whom an embryo formed using eggs other than her own is 
transferred.” See infra Part III, § 101(4); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (10th 
ed. 2014) (defining “gestational surrogate” as “[a] woman who carries out the 
gestational function and gives birth to a child for another . . . and who 
relinquishes any parental rights she may have upon the birth of the child.”). 
 17.  Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. 
 18.  Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An Empirical Analysis of the Use of the 
Intent Test to Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive Technology Cases, 50 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1295, 1309 tbl.1 (2013) (analyzing the 208 cases on Westlaw in which 
parentage of a child conceived via ART was determined). 
4
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determine parentage.19 In addition, since Professor Shultz 
published her article, every model parentage act that has been 
drafted in the United States has incorporated the intent test to 
determine legal parentage for children conceived via ART.20 
Part II of this article argues that states should adopt self-
executing parentage statutes based on the intent test to provide 
legal parents at the moment of birth to all children conceived 
via  ART.
21 As support for this proposition, Part II discusses the 
underlying goals of self-executing parentage statutes, and how, for 
children conceived via ART, the intent test best effectuates those 
goals. Part II also discusses results from a recent empirical study 
showing that, in over 74% of ART disputed-parentage cases, the 
intended parents were determined to be the legal parents.22 Part II 
concludes that consensus has been reached among scholars, 
legislatures, and courts in favor of using the intent test to 
determine legal parentage at the moment of birth for children 
conceived via ART.  
Part III of this article proposes a comprehensive ART statute 
that incorporates the intent test and provides legal parents at the 
moment of birth to all children conceived via ART as an example 
for states to adopt.23 
II. DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE OF CHILDREN CONCEIVED VIA 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AT THE MOMENT OF BIRTH 
States have been using self-executing statutes to determine 
parentage of children conceived via sexual reproduction for 
hundreds of years. In all fifty states, when a child is conceived via 
sexual reproduction, the woman who gives birth to the child is 
deemed the child’s legal mother.24 All fifty states also have a set of 
 
 19.  Id. at 1318. 
 20.  See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 801, 807 (2000) (amended 2002), 
9B U.L.A. 356, 362–63, 368 (Supp. 2014); MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED 
REPROD. TECH. §§ 603–604 (2008); see also Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-1125 of the 2014 Sess.) 
(basing parentage on intent when gestational surrogacy is used); UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 2–121(a)(4) (amended 2010) (using the intent test to determine 
parentage in a gestational surrogacy). 
 21.  See infra Part II.  
 22.  See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1317–18. 
 23.  See infra Part III.  
 24.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); 
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2015] CODIFYING THE INTENT TEST 135 
presumptions that identify the child’s legal father at the moment of 
birth.25 These statutory mechanisms provide a predictable means of 
determining parental rights and obligations at the moment of 
birth, and they avoid the costly and time-consuming process of 
obtaining a court order identifying the legal parents every time a 
child is born. 
When it comes to children conceived via ART, however, self-
executing parentage statutes are rare. As a result, most parents that 
use ART to create a family must obtain a court order to formalize 
their legal parent-child relationship. Thus, while legal parentage 
for children conceived via sexual reproduction is determined at 
birth through automatic, efficient, and predictable statutes, legal 
parentage for children conceived via ART typically is not 
determined at birth and requires the intervention of a court, which 
can be costly, time-consuming, and unpredictable.26 
It is our contention that it is time to bring the benefits of 
automatic, efficient, and predictable statutes to the determination 
of legal parentage for all children conceived via ART.27 We base this 
 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4(1) (Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).  
 25.  Typically, the person deemed the child’s legal father is: the man who is 
married to the biological mother at the time of the child’s birth; the man who, 
along with the biological mother, expressly acknowledges his paternity; or the man 
who receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his 
biological child. See, e.g., FAM. § 7611(a) (Westlaw); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
45/5(a) (Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 257.55; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 
(Westlaw); see also Appleton, supra note 3, at 233 (noting that the marital 
presumption “instantly designates a man as a child’s legal father at the time of 
birth”). 
 26.  Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: 
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 201, 216 (2009) (arguing that parentage laws should provide children 
of same-sex couples “certainty and stability . . . without requiring those parents to 
spend the money or time necessary for a court proceeding.”); see Rebecca Aviel, A 
New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2007 (2014) (asserting 
that family law’s emphasis on “formal legal status has been needlessly tethered to a 
traditionalist view of legitimate family composition” and arguing that parentage 
laws should be “determinate but not traditional” so as to include, inter alia, 
children conceived via ART).  
 27.  Professor Rebecca Aviel, in arguing for extending formal rules for 
identifying legal parents at birth to children conceived via ART, asserts that 
“[w]hatever differences we may sustain regarding how best to promote child 
welfare . . . it is difficult to argue that children are best served by a regime that 
cannot identify their parents prospectively and cannot ensure that any given 
6
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argument on two rationales: (1) self-executing ART parentage 
statutes can achieve the same social goals as the statutes that 
determine legal parents for children conceived via sexual 
reproduction;28 and (2) the past thirty years of study and 
experimentation have led scholars, legislatures, and courts to a 
consensus in favor of self-executing ART parentage statutes based 
on the intent test.29 
A. Achieving the Social Goals of Self-Executing Parentage Statutes 
For children conceived via sexual reproduction, state 
legislatures designate legal parentage via self-executing statutes that 
are based on a set of presumptions that identify legal parents in the 
same way for every child. For children conceived via sexual 
reproduction, the traditional basis for legal parentage is a 
presumption in favor of genetics.30 The woman who gives birth to a 
child conceived via sexual reproduction is the genetic mother and 
the legal mother.31 In addition, the marital presumption vests legal 
parentage in the birth-mother’s husband—the man presumed to 
be the genetic father.32 In the wake of the 1973 Uniform Parentage 
Act (1973 UPA), in an effort to remove the legal stigma attached 
 
individual is vested with parental status without a complex, multi-factor judicial 
determination.” Aviel, supra note 26, at 2063. 
 28.  See infra Part II.A. 
 29.  See infra Part II.B. 
 30.  DWYER, supra note 1, at 31–32 (“That biological parenthood remains the 
predominant focus even with marital births is evidenced by the fact that 
throughout the West, a husband’s presumption of paternity remains rebuttable on 
the basis of—and only on the basis of—genetic tests showing that he is not in fact 
the biological father.”); Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 329 (2004) (noting that “traditional family law . . . makes 
biology extremely important”).  
 31.  E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2012); see Shultz, supra note 12, at 316 (“In 
the main, the law’s assignment of parental status has followed nature. Biology 
provided definitive identification of the mother of a particular child. Bearing and 
birthing a child were physically apparent; motherhood was simply a fact.”). 
 32.  E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55, subdiv. 1(a). The reliance on the marital 
presumption as a proxy for genetics is demonstrated by the traditional exceptions 
to the presumption. The presumption did not apply if: (1) the husband and wife 
were not cohabitating; (2) the husband was sterile or impotent; (3) the husband 
was “beyond the four seas” at the time of conception; or (4) the race of the child 
did not match the husband’s. Appleton, supra note 3, at 251. In other words, if the 
child could not have been the husband’s genetic child, then the marital 
presumption identifying him as the legal father did not apply.  
7
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to non-marital births, every state added additional paternity 
presumptions to their parentage statutes.33 With these additional 
presumptions, men who were not married to the birth mother 
could assert their likely genetic relationship to the child, resulting 
in legal parentage at birth.34 The impact of these additional 
presumptions was that thousands of children who otherwise would 
not have had a legal father without a court proceeding had the 
benefit of two legal parents at the moment of birth. Parentage 
statutes for children conceived via sexual reproduction work so well 
not because they vest parentage in the genetic parent, per se, but 
because they include a presumption that applies in every case that 
avoids a post-birth factual inquiry and grants parentage to the 
persons that, in the majority of cases, will act in the best interests of 
the child. Although the exact details of the parentage 
presumptions have changed over time, self-executing parentage 
 
 33.  Under common law, a child born out of wedlock was considered 
illegitimate and therefore ineligible for many of the benefits available to children 
of married couples. In creating the 1973 UPA, the Uniform Law Commissioners 
addressed a number of problems related to parentage of non-marital children. 
Section 2 of the 1973 UPA states that the goal was to ensure that “[t]he parent and 
child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of 
the marital status of the parent.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 390 (1973). 
The 1973 UPA, however, included ART only to the extent that it provided legal 
parents to children conceived by alternative insemination to a married, 
heterosexual couple. Id. § 2, 9B U.L.A. 407–08. If a child was conceived via ART 
outside those narrow parameters, the “parent and child relationship” did not 
extend equally to her. Id. prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 378; see id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407–
08. 
 34.  In Minnesota, the paternity presumption statute makes clear that the 
presumption is based on an assumption about biology: “A man is presumed to be 
the biological father of a child if:” (1) he is married to the woman at the time of the 
child’s birth, (2) he, along with the biological mother, expressly acknowledges his 
paternity, or (3) “he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the 
child as his biological child” as the presumptive legal father. MINN. STAT. § 257.55, 
subdiv. 1 (emphasis added). See Appleton, supra note 3, at 258 (discussing how the 
traditional views of the paternity presumptions sought to “connect men and their 
likely genetic offspring”); see also Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New 
Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 527 (2000) 
(“For centuries . . . courts determined paternity by relying on a presumption about 
biological facts.”). Referring to the “holding out the child as his own” 
presumption, Appleton suggests that “[t]he rule most likely reflected a common-
sense inference: Why would a man undertake such responsibility and public 
acknowledgment of a child unless he knew he had fathered this child?” Appleton, 
supra note 3, at 257. 
8
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statutes have always sought to achieve the same well-accepted social 
goals of vesting legal parentage in the persons that: (1) are 
responsible for bringing the child into the world; (2) are most 
likely to care for the child; and (3) are the ones expecting to be the 
child’s legal parents.35 As explained below, the intended parents 
fulfill these same roles for children conceived via ART. 
1. Granting Legal Parentage to the Persons Responsible for Bringing 
the Child into the World 
One goal of statutory parentage presumptions is to grant legal 
parentage to the persons responsible for bringing the child into 
the world.36 It makes sense that legal parentage should be 
awarded—along with its attendant financial and social 
responsibilities—to the persons responsible for bringing the child 
into the world.37 Pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, states are 
obligated to ensure that all children are cared for.38 Although states 
take this obligation very seriously, they strongly prefer not to be the 
actual care providers for children. Instead, states fulfill their parens 
patriae obligations by establishing legal parent-child relationships, 
thereby shifting the duty to care for the child to the persons 
responsible for bringing the child into the world.39 For children 
conceived via sexual reproduction, the genetic parents always will 
 
 35.  Elizabeth Bartholet identified similar guidelines for determining legal 
parents: (1) provide children early in life with permanent parents; (2) provide 
children with nurturing parents; and (3) hold parents responsible. Bartholet, 
supra note 30, at 337–42; see also Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of 
Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 218 (2012) (identifying three “threads” for 
parentage rules: (1) parentage rules should provide stability; (2) the parents are 
responsible for the child, not the state; and (3) “parentage determinations are not 
made on a case-by-case basis”). 
 36.  Purvis, supra note 6, at 661–63; see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of 
Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 329 (2005). 
 37.  See SHULMAN, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 38.  James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the 
Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 766 (2009) (“The state acts vis a vis 
every newborn baby in a protective and provisional role, pursuant to its long-
recognized parens patriae authority . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Race Matters in Adoption, FAM. L.Q., Fall 2008, at 465, 
467 n.10 (noting that parens patrie refers to the state’s role as protector of 
children’s interests).  
 39.  See Howe, supra note 38, at 467. 
9
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2015] CODIFYING THE INTENT TEST 139 
be the persons responsible for bringing the child into the world. 
Accordingly, using genetics as a basis for parentage determinations 
of children conceived via sexual reproduction best effectuates this 
first underlying goal. 
For children conceived via ART, the intended parents always 
will be the persons ultimately responsible for bringing the child 
into the world. Indeed, conceiving a child using ART is one of the 
most intentional acts a person or couple undertakes. The intended 
parents must secure a means to fund the process, which, in the case 
of in vitro fertilization, typically costs tens of thousands of dollars.40 
The intended parents must also research and choose gamete 
providers (sperm donors and egg donors) and, in some cases, a 
surrogate. Although gamete providers and surrogates play vital 
roles in bringing the child into the world, it cannot be said that 
these adults are “responsible” for doing so. In fact, in nearly all 
cases, sperm donors, egg donors, and surrogates expressly 
relinquish any responsibility beyond their role of providing 
gametes or gestating the child. Thus, for children conceived via 
ART, awarding parentage to the intended parents best effectuates 
the goal of awarding parentage to the persons responsible for 
bringing the child into the world. 
2. Granting Legal Parentage to the Persons Most Likely to Care for 
the Child 
Another goal of statutory parentage presumptions is to award 
parentage to the persons most likely to care for the child.41 For 
children conceived via sexual reproduction, genetics is the most 
reliable and consistent indicator of whether an adult is likely to 
care for a child throughout the child’s minority.42 That is not to say 
 
 40.  Polina M. Dostalik, Embryo “Adoption”? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the Legal 
Consequences, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 874 (2011). 
 41.  DWYER, supra note 1, at 33 (“As with mothers, a state’s decision to make 
the biological connection determinative where a man seeks paternity might be 
based in part on an empirical assumption that a biological connection predisposes 
an adult to care for a child.”). 
 42.  MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS 
MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-
SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 63 (2001) (stating that “since biological parents have a 
variety of incentives to care for their children to the best of their ability, assigning 
custody to them tends to protect children’s interests”); Shultz, supra note 12, at 
319 (stating that “legal assignment of parental status has, typically drawn 
10
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that adults always will be devoted to caring for the children to 
whom they are genetically related. In some cases, a non-geneticly-
related adult may be the adult most capable of caring for the child. 
The goal of statutory parentage presumptions, however, is to 
establish a factor, or set of factors, that consistently and reliably 
predicts, at the moment of birth, who is most likely to care for a 
child. If that prediction turns out to be incorrect, the law provides 
mechanisms to terminate or limit parental rights down the road.43 
For children conceived via sexual reporoduction, all fifty states rely 
on a genetic relationship as the best proxy for effectuating the 
underlying social goal of awarding parentage to the persons most 
likely to care for the child throughout his or her minority. 
For children conceived via ART, the intent test is the most 
reliable and consistent indicator of who is most likely to care for 
the child. Intended parents who spend the time, energy, and 
money to conceive a child via ART assume that they also are 
responsible for supporting the child and caring for the child’s best 
interests. This conclusion is supported by a recent empirical study 
examining case outcomes in ART parentage determination cases.44 
The study examined over 200 cases and found that regardless of 
the stated basis for the court’s decision, in over 74% of cases, the 
court granted parentage to the intended parents.45 Since a best-
interests analysis is the cornerstone of nearly all legal 
determinations regarding children, it is safe to assume that these 
courts would not have placed children with their intended parents 
were it not, in fact, in the child’s best interests and if it were not 
 
legitimacy from its reflection of and alignment with biological givens”); see Annette 
Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
683, 68586 (2001) (defending a system that bases legal parentage, at least in part, 
on genetic relationship). 
 43.  See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-
Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 
102526 (2003). Codified next to parentage presumptions is an extensive series of 
laws concerning legal custody, physical custody, and parenting time—recognizing 
that genetic parents often do not properly care for their genetic children. If a 
genetic parent fails to act in the best interest of her child, or if a different adult 
would more likely act in the child’s best interest, the state is granted permission to 
make such legal determinations after the child is born. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 
§ 
 
260C.301, subdiv. 1(b) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(B) (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 legislation); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West, Westlaw 
through 2013 legislation). 
 44.  Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1317–18, 1324. 
 45.  Id. at 1317–18. 
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likely that these adults would care for the child. Courts that 
expressly used a best-interests analysis to determine legal parentage 
of children conceived via ART awarded parentage to the intended 
parents nearly 80% of the time.46 Thus, for children conceived via 
ART, granting parentage to the intended parents best effectuates 
the goal of granting parentage to the persons most likely to care for 
the child. 
3. Granting Legal Parentage to the Persons Expecting to Be the 
Child’s Parents 
A third goal of statutory parentage presumptions is to grant 
parentage to the persons expecting to be the child’s parents.47 For 
children conceived via sexual reproduction, those adults are the 
child’s genetic parents. When a woman gives birth to a child 
conceived via sexual reproduction, no one at the hospital wonders 
who is the child’s legal mother. It is evident that the woman who 
just gave birth is the child’s legal mother. This is the outcome the 
mother, her family, the community, and the law expects. Moreover, 
this outcome does not change, even if the birth mother has 
decided to place the child for adoption. The birth mother is still 
deemed to be the child’s legal mother, and her legal parental 
rights must be terminated in order for the child to be legally 
adopted by another.48 
It may be somewhat less evident who the child’s presumptive 
legal father is at the moment of the child’s birth. The laws in most 
states provide that the child’s presumptive legal father is: (1) the 
man who is married to the woman at the time of the child’s birth; 
(2) the man who, along with the biological mother, expressly 
acknowledges his paternity; or (3) the man who receives the child 
into his home and openly holds out the child as his biological 
child.49 These three presumptions serve as a proxy for determining 
 
 46.  Id. at 1317–18 tbl.7b.  
 47.  See DWYER, supra note 1, at 33 (asserting that determining parentage 
based on a “biological connection . . . . rests in part on beliefs about the natural 
entitlement of adults to possess their genetic offspring”); see also Purvis, supra note 
35, at 211 (“Traditional rules of identifying parents codify intuitive presumptions 
about parental status . . . .”); Dwyer, supra note 38, at 763 (“One might think it 
natural, even divinely ordained, that biological parents become the custodians of a 
baby.”). 
 48.  See MINN. STAT. § 257.74. 
 49.  See, e.g., id. § 257.55. 
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who is genetically related to the child,50 thereby granting parentage 
to the man expecting to be the child’s legal parent.51 Accordingly, 
these presumptions best effectuate the underlying social goal of 
awarding parentage to the persons expecting to be the 
child’s parents. 
For children conceived via ART, it is the intended parents who 
expect to be declared the legal parents. Take, for example, a 
couple consisting of two men who decide to conceive a child using 
a gestational surrogate and the egg of an anonymous gamete 
provider. At the time of transfer,52 the two men manifest their 
intent to be the legal parents of the resulting child, and the gamete 
provider and gestational surrogate manifest their intent not to be 
the legal parents of the child. Upon the birth of the child, a 
statutory parentage presumption based on the intent test would 
create a legal parent-child relationship between the child and both 
intended parents.53 This is the outcome the intended parents, their 
families, the gamete provider, the gestational surrogate, and the 
community expect. Thus, for children conceived via ART, granting 
parentage to the intended parents best effectuates the goal of 
granting parentage to the persons who expect to be declared the 
legal parents. 
Once a state decides to adopt self-executing parentage statutes 
for all children conceived via ART, it must determine whom those 
statutes should designate as the presumptive legal parents at the 
moment of birth. An examination of current parentage statutes for 
children conceived via sexual reproduction reveals that genetics is 
used as the presumptive proxy to effectuate the social goals of 
vesting legal parentage in the persons who are responsible for 
bringing the child into the world, the persons most likely to care 
for the child, and the persons expecting to be the child’s parents. 
These same social goals can be effectuated for children conceived 
via ART by enacting self-executing statutes that award legal 
parentage to the child’s intended parents at the moment of birth. 
 
 50.  See supra notes 24–35 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See supra note 34. 
 52.  “Transfer” means the placement of gametes or embryos into a woman’s 
reproductive tract for the purpose of achieving pregnancy and a live birth. See infra 
Part III, § 101. 
 53.  See Shultz, supra note 12, at 322–23. 
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B. The Consensus in Favor of the Intent Test 
For the past thirty years, legal commentators, legislatures, and 
courts have been exploring the contours of the intent test and how 
best to apply it in cases involving ART. Dozens of law review articles 
have been written on the subject, with the vast majority favoring the 
use of the intent test for ART.54 As early as 1998, Janet Dolgin 
discussed an “emerging consensus” that was forming around the 
intent test.55 Eleven years later, Nancy Polikoff described the intent 
test as having “support from the mainstream of the legal 
profession.”56 The following year, Courtney Joslin joined the 
growing chorus of legal scholars advocating for the intent test, 
questioning why the law has been so resistant to keeping up with 
developments around ART.57 
In addition, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Bar Association 
(ABA) have empaneled groups of experts in the field of family law 
to consider parentage determinations of children conceived via 
ART. Both groups incorporated the intent test into their model 
statutes.58 
NCCUSL’s 2002 Uniform Parentage Act (2002 UPA) 
expanded coverage of children conceived via ART. The 2002 UPA 
 
 54.  See, e.g., Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage 
Determinations when Assisted Reproductive Technology is Used to Create Families, 62 ARK. 
L. REV. 29, 5456 (2009); Difonzo & Stern, supra note 4, at 405–11; Linda D. Elrod, 
A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 245, 266–70 (2011); Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, 
Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1222–29 (2010); 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. 
L.J. 1223, 125559 (2013); Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced 
Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 107, 13639 (2014); Polikoff, supra note 26, at 23334, 26567; Purvis, 
supra note 35, at 22730, 25253; Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of 
Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 163840 (2013); Richard F. Storrow, 
Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to 
Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 67579 (2002).  
 55.  Dolgin, supra note 11, at 23536, 28081. 
 56.  Polikoff, supra note 26, at 234 (“A brief history of the law of assisted 
reproduction demonstrates that the groundwork for a statute making consent 
[with the intent to parent] the key to parentage . . . is in place and has support 
from the mainstream of the legal profession.”). 
 57.  Joslin, supra note 54, at 1180–81, 1222–23. 
 58.  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299–376 
(Supp. 2014); MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008). 
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addresses ART issues such as excluding gamete donors from 
parentage, awarding parentage to the intended parents in a 
gestational surrogacy, and covering situations in which a child is 
conceived via ART after death or divorce.59 Although the 2002 UPA 
makes progress toward incorporating the intent test, it falls short. 
First, Article 7 (Child of Assisted Reproduction) uses language 
making it applicable exclusively to heterosexual couples.60 Second, 
although Article 8 (Gestational Agreements) incorporates an intent 
element, it specifies that the intended parents must be married, in 
turn alienating single parents and unmarried couples, including 
same-sex couples in places where marriage is not possible.61 As a 
result, the 2002 UPA fails to provide legal parents to all children at 
the moment of birth.62 
Another attempt at legislating parentage in light of emerging 
reproductive technologies is the ABA’s Model Act Governing 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ABA Model Act). Article 6 of 
the ABA Model Act roughly mirrors Article 7 of the 2002 UPA, but 
takes additional steps in the right direction by using the intent test 
and gender-neutral language to determine parentage of children 
conceived via ART.63 Article 7 of the ABA Model Act closely 
resembles Article 8 of the 2002 UPA regarding gestational 
 
 59.  It added language stating that, in addition to male sperm donors, female 
egg donors should be excluded from parentage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B 
U.L.A. 355–56. The 2002 UPA also addresses gestational surrogacy; specifically, 
Article 8 grants legal parentage to the intended parents, provided they are 
married and have a court-approved gestational agreement. Id. § 801, 9B U.L.A. 
362–63. 
 60.  See id. § 703, 9B U.L.A. 356 (“A man who provides sperm for, or consents 
to, assisted reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her 
child, is a parent of the resulting child.”). 
 61.  See id. § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362–63. 
 62.  For a critique of the 2002 UPA, see Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to 
Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 
17071 (2007). 
 63.  “An individual who . . . consents to[] assisted reproduction by a woman 
as provided in [this Act] with the intent to be a parent of her child is a parent of 
the resulting child.” MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 603. In 
2008, the Uniform Law Commissioners drafting the Uniform Probate Code also 
addressed ART and incorporated the intent test. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) 
(1969) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 129–31 (2013). “[A] parent-child relationship 
exists between a child of assisted reproduction and an individual other than the 
birth mother who consented to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with 
intent to be treated as the other parent of the child.” Id. 
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surrogacy agreements, with the exception that under the ABA 
Model Act, the intended parents need not be married.64 Both 
Articles 6 and 7 of the ABA Model Act are closer to an ideal statute, 
although there are still unnecessary limitations including a 
requirement of written consent and court approval for gestational 
surrogacy agreements.65 Here again, progress is made, but the Act is 
ultimately too narrow to provide legal parents to all children at the 
moment of birth. 
Individual state legislatures also have moved toward the intent 
test. Illinois has incorporated the intent test into its Gestational 
Surrogacy Act.66 Delaware’s Uniform Parentage Act includes a 
provision for the paternity of children conceived via ART, which 
states, “The child shall be considered the child of the intended 
parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child.”67 
Likewise, New Mexico’s Uniform Parentage Act grants parentage to 
the intended parents provided they sign a required consent form 
before conception.68 
Finally, based on an empirical study completed last year, we 
now know that courts, too, favor awarding legal parentage of 
children conceived via ART to the intended parents. In 2013, 
researchers conducted an empirical study of all cases on Westlaw 
addressing parentage of ART children.69 Each case was coded and 
analyzed based on which test the court used to determine legal 
parentage and which factors were statistically significant in making 
 
 64.  Compare MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. art. 7, with UNIF. 
PARENTAGE ACT § 801–809, 9B U.L.A. 362–70. 
 65.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. arts. 6–7. 
 66.  This Act, which went into effect in 2005 and applies exclusively to 
surrogacy, allows for the intended parents to be the legal parents immediately 
upon the birth of the child. The parties must create a valid surrogacy contract 
meeting the requirements set forth in the statute, but unlike the 2002 UPA and 
the Model Act, the agreement does not need court approval. This simplifies the 
process for everyone involved. However, the Gestational Surrogacy Act could use 
some refining in order to make the language less ambiguous. In some provisions it 
uses “intended mother” and “intended father,” while in others it uses “intended 
parent or parents.” Although this seems to say that the Act would apply to a single 
parent, it may cause some confusion in determining whether it extends to same-
sex couples. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).  
 67.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 
legislation). 
 68.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-704 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.). 
 69.  Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1297. 
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that determination.70 The empirical data demonstrates two 
important findings. First, when faced with determining parentage 
of ART children, most judges will apply a state statute to make their 
decision, even if the statute did not originally contemplate the 
situation before them.71 Second, and more importantly, regardless 
of the test used by the court, in over 74% of the cases, the outcome 
was the same as if the intent test had been used.72 Both of these 
findings are discussed below. 
Without clear guidance from the legislature, finding a basis for 
parentage determinations for children conceived via ART has been 
left to the courts.73 The empirical data shows that, over the past 30 
years, courts have developed five different tests to determine 
parentage of children conceived via ART: (1) applying a state 
statute; (2) relying on public policy; (3) determining what is in the 
best interests of the child; (4) awarding parentage to the genetic 
parents; and (5) awarding parentage to the adults who, at the time 
of conception, intended to raise the child.74 
Judges used a statutory approach in over 51% of the cases 
surveyed, even if the statute did not expressly cover the particular 
situation before them.75 For example, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
expanded the application of its alternative insemination statute, 
which applied only to a woman and her husband, to include the 
same-sex domestic partner of a woman who gave birth to a child 
conceived via alternative insemination.76 The court recognized that 
the presumptions in Oregon’s parentage statute were designed, in 
part, “to protect children conceived by artificial insemination from 
 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  See id. at 1301–04.  
 72.  Id. at 1316–18.  
 73.  See, e.g., Difonzo & Stern, supra note 4, at 376–77 (“Courts are the 
beachhead for this revolution, because society is evolving faster than the formal 
legal system, and disputes are often presented to judges who have little statutory or 
case law guidance in these new areas.”); Dolgin, supra note 11, at 234 (“Courts 
have spearheaded and sustained the law’s response to reproductive technology in 
the United States. Legislatures have been slow to respond, and when they have 
responded, they have rarely created comprehensive regulatory schemes.”). 
 74.  Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1301. 
 75.  Id. at 1304. Over 20% of judges applied the intent test, 16% applied a 
best-interests-of-the-child analysis, 8% relied on public policy, and 3% based their 
decision on genetics. Id. at 1309 tbl.1. 
 76.  Shineovich & Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); see OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 109.243 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.). 
17
Byrn and Holzer: Codifying the Intent Test
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
2015] CODIFYING THE INTENT TEST 147 
being denied the right to support by the mother’s husband or to 
inherit from the husband.”77 The court concluded that this 
presumption should apply regardless whether the couple was 
comprised of a woman and her husband, or a woman and her 
same-sex partner.78 
The judiciary’s desire to take a statutory approach makes sense 
in light of the fact that parentage laws always have been matters for 
the legislature, and applying a statute is the standard protocol 
when it comes to determining parentage. The cases in the 
empirical study show that judges are willing to go to great lengths 
to find and apply a statute, as opposed to, say, using a best-interests-
of-the-child approach, because they do not believe that establishing 
initial parentage should be determined by a case-by-case, factual 
inquiry. 
The judiciary’s preference for a statutory approach highlights 
the need for each state to adopt a comprehensive parentage statute 
that covers all children conceived via ART. When there is a dispute 
over parentage, courts should be able to apply a state statute in a 
straightforward and predictable manner. Such statutes would 
remove the legal uncertainty, for both the parent and the child, 
currently present in ART cases. Moreover, comprehensive 
parentage statutes that cover all children conceived via ART would 
largely eliminate the need for the courts to be involved at all. When 
a child is conceived via sexual reproduction, there is no post-birth 
factual inquiry; a judge is not required to weigh facts before 
declaring the mother and father legal parents. Rather, a self-
executing parentage statute, based on a set of presumptions, 
operates to create the legal parent-child relationship. Parenting 
determinations for children conceived via ART should be no 
different than parentage determinations for children conceived via 
sexual reproduction—no less automatic, no less predictable, and 
no less equitable. 
The most significant finding of the empirical study was the fact 
that, in the overwhelming majority of ART parentage cases, legal 
parentage was granted to the intended parents.79 In over 20% of 
 
 77.  Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40. 
 78.  Id. (“There appears to be no reason for permitting heterosexual couples 
to bypass adoption proceedings by conceiving a child through mutually 
consensual artificial insemination, but not permitting same-sex couples to do so.”). 
 79.  Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1316–18. 
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cases, judges applied the intent test.80 Of the remaining cases, 
regardless of the stated basis of the judge’s decision—statute, best 
interests of the child, public policy, or genetics—in over 66% of 
cases, the result was the same as if the judge had used the intent 
test.81 These results confirm that the intent test is a common-sense 
approach to determining parentage that is consistent with the 
overarching goals of determining legal parentage. These results 
also confirm that adopting ART statutes based on the intent test 
will, in the majority of circumstances, lead to outcomes that are 
aligned with how judges currently determine parentage in ART 
cases. 
III. PROPOSED MODEL ACT GOVERNING PARENTAGE OF CHILDREN 
CONCEIVED VIA ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Following is a model parentage act regarding ART that, if 
adopted, would determine legal parentage of all children 
conceived via ART at the moment of birth. The provisions draw 
from prior uniform and model acts—in particular, the 2002 UPA82 
and the ABA Model Act83—both of which utilize the intent test but 
ultimately fall short of covering all children concevied via ART. 
Some of the differences between these acts and our provisions are: 
 Our provisions acknowledge the parentage of same-sex 
couples who intend to be legal parents.84 
 Our provisions rely more comprehensively on the intent test, 
granting legal parentage even in the absence of formalities 
such as a written contract.85 
 When surrogacy is used, our provisions automatically provide 
legal parentage to the intended parents upon the birth of the 
child, without requiring judicial intervention.86 
 
 80.  Id. at 1309 tbl.1.  
 81.  Id. at 1316–19. 
 82.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299–376 (Supp. 
2014). 
 83.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008). 
 84.  Contra UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704, 9B U.L.A. 356–57 (contemplating 
consent to assisted reproduction by “a woman and a man”). 
 85.  Contra MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 604 (“Consent 
by an individual who intends to be a parent of a child born by assisted 
reproduction must be in a signed record.”). 
 86.  Contra UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803, 9B U.L.A 364 (“If the requirements of 
subsection (b) are satisfied, a court may issue an order validating the gestational 
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The main difference between the 2002 UPA and ABA Model 
Act and our model act is that our model act provides a simpler and 
more comprehensive set of provisions that determines legal 
parentage of all children conceived via ART at the moment of 
birth. We offer this proposed model act with the hope that state 
legislatures will modify their existing parentage statutes to include 
these provisions. 
SECTION 101. DEFINITIONS 
(1) “Assisted reproduction” means a method of achieving 
pregnancy through means other than sexual intercourse. 
(2) “Gamete provider” means an individual who provides eggs 
or sperm to be used for assisted reproduction, whether or not the 
gamete provider also is an intended parent, whether or not the 
gametes are provided for consideration, and whether or not the 
gamete provider is known by the intended parent(s) or is 
anonymous. 
(3) “Gestational agreement” means an agreement between the 
intended parent(s) and a gestational carrier regarding the use of 
assisted reproduction for the purpose of achieving pregnancy and a 
live birth. 
(4) “Gestational carrier” means a woman who gestates a child 
that was conceived via assisted reproduction. This definition 
includes a “traditional surrogate” (a woman who is not an intended 
parent who undergoes insemination and fertilization of her own 
eggs), a “gestational surrogate” (a woman who is not an intended 
parent into whom an embryo formed using eggs other than her 
own is transferred), and a “gestational mother” (a woman who is an 
intended parent who carries the child by any means of assisted 
reproduction). 
(5) “Intended parent” means an individual, married or 
unmarried, who manifests the intent to be the legal parent of a 
child conceived via assisted reproduction. The intent to be a legal 
parent must be manifested at the time of transfer. 
(6) “Legal parent” means an individual who has a legally 
recognized parent-child relationship with a child. 
(7) “Legal spouse” means an individual married to another, or 
who has a legal relationship to another that this state accords rights 
 
agreement and declaring that the intended parents will be the parents of a child 
born during the term of the agreement.”). 
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and responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those of 
marriage. 
(8) “Posthumous conception” means the transfer of gametes 
or embryos for the purpose of achieving pregnancy and a live birth 
after a gamete provider who is also an intended parent has died. 
(9) “Transfer” means the placement of gametes or embryos 
into a woman’s reproductive tract for the purpose of achieving 
pregnancy and a live birth. 
Authors’ Commentary87 
Section 101 draws from 2002 UPA section 10288 and ABA 
Model Act section 102.89 
Subsection (2), “gamete provider.” Both the 2002 UPA and the 
ABA Model Act use the term “donor.” These statutory provisions 
use “gamete provider” because many people who provide gametes 
do not “donate” their genetic material. A variety of individuals 
provide gametes to be used for assisted reproduction, including: 
(1) men and women who provide gametes to known and unknown 
third parties for compensation; (2) men and women who provide 
gametes to known and unknown third parties for no compensation; 
and (3) men and women who provide gametes for the purpose of 
becoming an intended parent. 
Subsection (3), “gestational agreement.” These statutory 
provisions do not contain specific requirements of a gestational 
agreement. In order to protect the interests of everyone involved, 
we recommend that a gestational agreement be in writing, which is 
often the clearest way to manifest intent. See the Illinois 
Gestational Surrogacy Act90 for an example of a comprehensive 
statute governing gestational agreements. Each state that adopts 
these provisions may specify the necessary components of a 
gestational agreement. 
SECTION 102. SCOPE OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
These statutory provisions apply only to children conceived via 
assisted reproduction. These provisions do not apply to children 
conceived via sexual intercourse. 
 
 87.  The commentary after each section is for the reader’s own use. It is not 
meant to be enacted along with the statutory provisions. 
 88.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102, 9B U.L.A 303–06. 
 89.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102. 
 90.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1–75 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).  
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Authors’ Commentary 
Section 102 draws from 2002 UPA section 70191 and ABA 
Model Act section 601.92 
SECTION 103. PARENTAL STATUS OF GAMETE PROVIDER 
A gamete provider may or may not also be a legal parent of a 
child conceived via assisted reproduction. A gamete provider is also 
a legal parent only if he or she meets the requirements of section 
105. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 103 diverges from 2002 UPA section 70293 and ABA 
Model Act section 602,94 which provide that a “donor” is never a 
legal parent of a child conceived via assisted reproduction. 
Some gamete providers provide gametes to third parties with 
the express intention of not becoming a legal parent. Other 
gamete providers may be intended parents pursuant to section 
105—for instance, a woman who provides her fertilized eggs to her 
same-sex spouse or partner and intends to be the legal parent of 
the resulting child immediately upon birth of the child. 
SECTION 104. PARENTAL STATUS OF GESTATIONAL 
CARRIER 
A gestational carrier may or may not also be a legal parent of a 
child conceived via assisted reproduction. A gestational carrier is 
also a legal parent only if she meets the requirements of section 
105. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 104 diverges from 2002 UPA section 801(a)(2)95 and 
ABA Model Act section 701(1)(b),96 which use a narrower 
definition of gestational carrier than section 104 employs.97 
 
 91.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701, 9B U.L.A. 354. 
 92.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 601. 
 93.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355–56. 
 94.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 602. 
 95.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 362. 
 96.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 701(1)(b). 
 97.  See id. § 102(16) (“‘Gestational carrier’ means an adult woman, not an 
intended parent, who enters into a gestational agreement to bear a child . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/5
 
152 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
Some gestational carriers bear children with the express 
intention of not becoming a legal parent. Other gestational carriers 
may be intended parents pursuant to section 105—for instance, a 
woman who bears a child using fertilized eggs provided to her by 
her same-sex spouse or partner and who intends to be the legal 
parent of the resulting child immediately upon birth of the child. 
SECTION 105. PARENTAGE OF CHILD CONCEIVED VIA 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
An individual who intends to be a legal parent of a child 
conceived via assisted reproduction is a legal parent of the resulting 
child immediately upon birth of the child. An individual’s intent to 
be a legal parent must be objectively manifested and mutually 
agreed-upon by all intended parents at the time of transfer. A 
written agreement between the intended parents may serve as 
evidence of intent. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 105 draws from 2002 UPA section 70498 and ABA 
Model Act sections 603 and 604.99 This section codifies the intent 
test, which provides that the adult or adults who intended to bring 
a child into the world through the use of assisted reproduction and 
who intended to parent the child are the legal parents of the 
resulting child immediately upon birth.100 
To be as inclusive as possible to the individuals who use 
assisted reproduction, this section is gender-neutral and makes no 
distinction between married and unmarried individuals. The 
marital presumption of paternity does not establish parentage of a 
child conceived via assisted reproduction. Nor does a woman’s 
giving birth to a child conceived via assisted reproduction establish 
maternity of the resulting child. Under this section, an individual 
may establish parentage only through intent. 
 
 98.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704, 9B U.L.A. 356–57. 
 99.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 603–04. 
 100.  See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (vesting legal 
parentage in the party or parties that affirmatively intended to conceive a child via 
assisted reproduction and to raise the resulting child because the child would not 
exist “[b]ut for their acted-on intention”); see also Shultz, supra note 12, at 323 
(“Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are 
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express, and bargained-for ought presumptively to 
determine legal parenthood.”). 
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Often, a written agreement among the intended parents is 
used to objectively manifest intent to be a legal parent of a child 
conceived via assisted reproduction.101 However, there are cases in 
which intent to be a legal parent is objectively manifested and 
mutually agreed-upon by each intended parent in the absence of a 
written agreement. This section does not require a written 
agreement because some intended parents do not have the legal 
knowledge or financial means to execute a written agreement, or 
choose not to have a written agreement for other reasons. Not 
requiring a written agreement ensures that the intended parents 
are protected and that their children conceived via assisted 
reproduction have legal parents at birth. 
Courts increasingly recognize that families sometimes include 
more than two parents.102 These statutory provisions do not 
preclude recognition of more than two intended parents. The 
language requiring mutual agreement among all intended parents, 
however, provides a limiting factor as to the number of intended 
parents recognized under this section. States may choose to include 
a provision expressly limiting the number of intended parents a 
child may have. 
SECTION 106. WITHDRAWAL OF INTENT TO BE A LEGAL 
PARENT 
An individual’s intent to be a legal parent via assisted 
reproduction may be withdrawn by that individual at any time 
before transfer by objectively manifesting the withdrawal to the 
other intended parent (or parents). An individual who withdraws 
 
 101.  An example of a statute that requires a written agreement in order to vest 
parentage in the intended parent(s) is the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act. See 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (“‘Intended 
parent’ means a person or persons who enters into a gestational surrogacy 
contract with a gestational surrogate pursuant to which he or she will be the legal 
parent of the resulting child.”). 
 102.  See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 47576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(granting the biological mother, her former lesbian partner, and the known male 
gamete provider custody rights); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002) (recognizing “legal 
parents,” “parent[s] by estoppel,” and “de facto parents” in its definitions); Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 1719 (2008); 
Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and 
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 32732 (2007); 
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 7475 (2007).  
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intent before transfer is not a legal parent of the resulting child. An 
individual may not withdraw intent to be a legal parent after 
transfer. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 106 draws from 2002 UPA section 706103 and ABA 
Model Act section 606.104 
SECTION 107. EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
(a) If a marriage is dissolved before transfer, any prior intent 
to be a legal parent of a child conceived via assisted reproduction is 
presumed revoked. If, after dissolution, former legal spouses 
objectively manifest the intent to be legal parents of the resulting 
child at the time of transfer, both are legal parents of the resulting 
child pursuant to section 105. 
(b) If a marriage is dissolved after transfer, and both legal 
spouses intended at the time of transfer to be legal parents of the 
resulting child, they are both legal parents of the resulting child. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 107 draws from 2002 UPA section 706105 and ABA 
Model Act section 606.106 
SECTION 108. DISPUTE OF PARENTAGE 
The legal parent of a child conceived via assisted reproduction 
may not challenge his or her parentage of the child under section 
105 unless a proceeding is commenced to adjudicate parentage 
within two years after the legal parent learns of the birth of the 
child. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 108 draws from 2002 UPA section 705107 and ABA 
Model Act section 605.108 Unlike the 2002 UPA and ABA Model Act, 
this provision is not limited to legal spouses. 
 
 103.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 358 
(Supp. 2014). 
 104.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 606. 
 105.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706, 9B U.L.A. 358. 
 106.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 606. 
 107.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705, 9B U.L.A. 357–58. 
 108.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 605. 
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SECTION 109. PARENTAL STATUS OF DECEASED 
INDIVIDUAL 
Except as otherwise provided in this state’s probate code, if an 
individual who intended to be a legal parent pursuant to section 
105 dies before transfer of that individual’s gametes, the deceased 
individual is not a legal parent of a child resulting from 
posthumous conception unless the deceased individual objectively 
manifested the intent that if assisted reproduction were to occur 
after death, the deceased individual would be a legal parent of the 
child. If an intended parent dies after transfer, he or she is a legal 
parent of the resulting child. 
Authors’ Commentary 
Section 109 draws from 2002 UPA section 707109 and ABA 
Model Act section 607.110 
In Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., the Supreme Court endorsed 
the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 416(e) and 416(h)(2)(A), which are used to determine whether 
a posthumously conceived child meets the definition of a “child” 
under the Social Security Act and is thus eligible for survivor 
benefits.111 The Social Security Administration’s longstanding policy 
is to “‘apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s 
domiciliary State].’”112 
Given the limited means of ascertaining the intent of a 
deceased gamete provider who is also a purported intended parent, 
it is recommended that a state require clear and convincing 
evidence that the deceased individual objectively manifested intent 
that if transfer were to occur after death, the deceased individual 
would be a legal parent of the child. 
A state may also wish to impose a time limit, after death, within 
which the surviving intended parent(s) must act.113 
 
 109.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707, 9B U.L.A. 358–59. 
 110.  MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607. 
 111.  132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012). 
 112.  See id. at 2028 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)). 
 113.  See Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation 
Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How 
to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 425 (2011) (“It is important to establish 
a limitation period to provide finality to the administration process in those 
scenarios where a posthumously conceived child could ‘divest’ others of all or part 
of their share of the decedent’s estate. Without this, an estate could remain open 
indefinitely while the executor waits for a posthumously conceived child to be 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For several decades, parentage of children conceived via ART 
has been left to the courts. During that time, legal scholars have 
advocated for the application of the intent test to determine 
parentage of children conceived via ART. In addition, model acts 
have incorporated the intent test, as have several state legislatures. 
New empirical data shows that in over 74% of disputed parentage 
cases involving ART, judges awarded parentage to the intended 
parents. A consensus has been reached. Scholars, legislatures, and 
courts agree that the intent test is the appropriate means for 
determining legal parentage at the moment of birth for children 
conceived via ART. Using the intent test as the basis for parentage 
statutes for children conceived via ART provides an automatic, 
efficient, and predictable means of determining parentage that is 
consistent with the overarching goals of determining legal 
parentage and will ensure that all children have legal parents at the 
moment of birth. The time has come for state legislatures to codify 
the intent test. 
 
 
born—an event which may never happen.”). 
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